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Preface 
 
This book is the first part of an investigation into defences in private law. The present 
volume explores tort law defences. Three further volumes are planned, on unjust 
enrichment, contract and equity. The chapters that constitute the present volume were 
delivered at a workshop at All Souls College, Oxford in January 2014.  In helping to 
bring the workshop to fruition, we are grateful, first and foremost, for the support of 
All Souls College, which provided both the setting for the proceedings and significant 
financial support. The workshop could not have gone ahead without the further 
financial assistance of the Oxford Law Faculty and the University of Oxford’s Fell 
Fund. We were also able to call on several members of the Faculty—both 
administrative and academic—for guidance. Discussions at the workshop were 
greatly enriched by the contributions of several observers, including Lord Hoffmann, 
Timothy Endicott and John Gardner and, on behalf of the Law Commission, 
Sir David Lloyd-Jones and David Hertzell. Finally, Anna Kim’s patience and 
efficiency helped immeasurably in the lead up to the workshop.  
 For their assistance in helping to turn the workshop papers into the chapters that 
feature in this volume, we are grateful to Jodi Gardner, Elizabeth Houghton, 
Krishnaprasad Kizhakkevalappil, Niranjan Venkatesan and Binesh Hass. We are 
indebted to Hart Publishing for their editorial assistance, and in particular to Richard 
Hart for the characteristic enthusiasm and professionalism with which he embraced 
the project as a whole. Finally, we are grateful to Lord Hoffmann for generously 
agreeing to write the Foreword.  
 
Andrew Dyson 
James Goudkamp 
Frederick Wilmot-Smith 
 
31 August 2014 
Oxford  
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CENTRAL ISSUES IN THE LAW OF TORT DEFENCES  
 
 
Andrew Dyson, James Goudkamp and Frederick Wilmot-Smith 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1.   The Point of the Project 
 
This book is the first in a series of four that is concerned with defences to liability 
arising in private law. We feel that the topic has not received the attention that it 
deserves. Engagement with defences is strikingly absent from many theoretical works 
in private law.1 Furthermore, whilst specific defences are often well-covered in the 
textbooks, there is a lack of understanding as to how the various defences fit together, 
both within individual branches of private law, and across private law. The purpose of 
this series is to take steps towards remedying this situation. The present book focuses 
on tort law. Later books in the series will address unjust enrichment, contract and 
equity. 
 
1.2.   Defences in Tort, Unjust Enrichment, Contract and Equity? 
 
The division of the four volumes in our project reflects an important premise, namely, 
that there is some value in dividing defences up according to the area of private law to 
which they pertain. There is surely some value in this approach, and the sheer scale of 
the law concerning defences in private law prevented us from investigating them 
satisfactorily within a single volume. However, our chosen classificatory scheme 
itself raises certain difficult issues, and one might legitimately question whether it 
reflects any divisions of theoretical importance.  
 One concern with arranging defences in this way is that it might seem to 
presuppose the stability and coherence of each of the areas of private law that we have 
identified. Is it right to say that there is a coherent law of tort, contract, unjust 
enrichment and equity? These issues have long been discussed.2 We have adopted this 
classification partly because it is conventional. However, we have also utilised it 
because we hope that doing so will result in debates about its satisfactoriness being 
informed by the law on defences. Discussions about the way in which private law 
should be organised have tended to focus on matters such as the events that generate 
obligations and the remedies that are available for failure to comply with those 
obligations. Rarely has thought been given to how defences might be relevant to the 
organisation of private law. To what extent are tort, contract, unjust enrichment and 
equity distinct in terms of defences?  
 A different concern that one might have is not with the coherence of each area of 
private law but with the value of dividing defences in this way. How much unity 
                                                 
1  See, eg, the almost complete absence of discussion of defences in J Oberdiek (ed), Philosophical 
Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). 
2  See, eg, the essays in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1997). 
between defences within each area must there be to justify studying them together? 
How similar are, for instance, tort defences to one another? As it happens, several of 
the defences addressed in this volume—such as illegality and limitation bars—are not 
exclusive to tort law but are available throughout private law generally.3 This fact 
might be thought to count against organising the series in the way that we have. 
However, it is also the case that many such defences possess features that are unique 
to, or at least conditioned by, particular branches of private law.  
 A final general concern that readers might have is with the very concept of a 
defence. The term might be thought to have so many distinct meanings that it is 
impossible to discuss defences as a unified subject. We will examine some of the 
issues raised by the term in this chapter. There is no doubt that many of the 
contributors to this volume use the word ‘defence’ in rather different ways from each 
other. However, we are reassured by the fact that the contributors to this volume 
engage extensively with each other.  
 
1.3.   The Topics of the Book 
 
The chapters in the present book range from treatments of broad theoretical questions 
to analyses of the minutiae of individual defences. As editors we have tried not to 
prejudge the disputes or topics of interest that might be raised. Consequently, we have 
not imposed our own views as to whether, for example, certain rules are appropriately 
regarded as defences,4 or whether they are appropriately thought of as part of the ‘law 
of torts’5 Of course, not all defences are represented; indeed, some important defences 
are not discussed at all. One reason for this is that it would be quite impossible to deal 
satisfactorily with even the most significant tort defences in a single volume. Another 
reason is that this book is not intended as an encyclopaedia of tort defences. Rather, 
its aim is to explore themes that run throughout tort defences, especially where those 
themes might connect with defences in other areas of private law. 
 
1.4.   The Purpose and Structure of this Chapter 
 
In this chapter, we contextualise some of the debates in the book, in order to bring out 
some general themes that run through the chapters and also to raise a few questions 
thrown up by certain specific defences. In selecting general themes, we have tended to 
focus on issues that generated debate between our contributors, and which featured 
prominently in discussions at the workshop at which drafts of these chapters were 
delivered. In selecting for discussion issues that pertain to specific defences, we have 
attempted to draw out the wider implications of the analyses offered by our 
contributors and to clarify their relationship with other debates. 
 We have split this chapter into three principal sections, though the sections are 
neither exhaustive nor hermetically sealed. We first examine what a defence actually 
is. In the second principal section we turn to some general questions that the study of 
defences throws up across private law. Finally, we draw out some themes and 
                                                 
3  This prompted Robert Stevens to contend that illegality should not be studied specifically in 
relation to tort law: R Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 304–05. 
4  It is, for example, disputed whether contributory negligence is a defence given that it does not 
prevent liability from arising but merely affects the quantum of recovery. We address this issue 
below: see 2.3. 
5  In relation to the question whether invasion of privacy is a tort, see Barbara McDonald’s chapter at 
… 
defences that are most commonly associated with the criminal law, such as the 
distinction between justifications and excuses, which may also be of relevance to 
private law theorists. 
 
2. What is a Defence? 
 
It quickly became clear at the workshop that there was no consensus as to what the 
term ‘defence’ means. There seem to be several disagreements, many of which arise 
in the chapters that follow. In this section, we begin by considering a conundrum that 
pervades this field, namely whether it is possible to separate the definition of a 
defence from the consequences of something being a defence. We then consider two 
principal ways in which scholars have tried to understand the concept of a defence. 
The first attempts to distinguish defences from denials of a cause of action; the second 
attempts to define defences by reference to their effects.  
 
2.1  Definition or Consequence?6  
 
One question that any scholar working on defences faces is: what is a defence? 
Another question is: what are the implications, if any, of classifying something as a 
defence? These questions might be viewed as distinct: one concerns the definition of a 
defence; the other what the consequences are of classifying something as a defence.7 
We will, therefore, refer to the distinction as one between definition and consequence. 
To illustrate the point, consider, first, Tony Weir’s assertion that ‘[c]ontributory 
negligence is unquestionably a defence … [since] it is for the defendant to plead and 
prove it.’8 Implicitly, Weir seems to claim that a defining characteristic of a defence is 
that they are rules that the defendant must plead and prove.9 But now consider Robert 
Stevens’ claim that ‘[t]he most important practical effect of characterising an issue as 
being a defence is that it will usually determine who has to prove what as a matter of 
evidence.’10 If some doctrine is a defence, Stevens claims, a consequence is that this 
classification will (‘usually’) determine which party bears the onus of proof in 
relation to it.11  
The interrelation between these questions is important. In particular, it seems that 
certain answers to the first question cannot be used to infer answers to the second. 
Consider, for instance, Andrew Burrows’ claim that ‘[t]he very notion of a defence … 
carries with it the practical consequence that the legal burden of proving a defence is 
on the defendant’. This might be understood as a definition, namely, that defences are 
those doctrines that the defendant must prove. But Burrows also claims: (1) that 
limitation is a defence; (2) that the burden of disproving limitation is on the claimant 
                                                 
6  We thank Luís Duarte d’Almeida for his comments on an earlier draft of this section, which saved 
us from numerous errors.  
7  L Duarte d’Almeida, p. 10–11 (A4).  
8  T Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006) 129. See, further, 
WVH Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 18th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 120 [4.19] 
(footnote omitted). 
9  Our point here is not exegetical: even if we misread Weir’s purpose, such a claim is clearly 
plausible. 
10  [Text accompanying fn 16]. 
11  Notice that at [Text following fn 16] Stevens explicitly rejects the suggestion that this proposition is 
‘a defining feature of what a defence is.’ On the relevance of pleadings to defences, see Section 2 of 
Richard Epstein’s essay: we are unsure whether to read the claim as one of definition or of 
derivation (or whether he would reject this distinction). 
and, therefore; (3) that English law should be changed to place the burden of proving 
limitation on the defendant. This reasoning would be fallacious if Burrows’ initial 
claim indeed were that defences should be defined in terms of their burden of proof: 
(1) and (2) would then be plainly inconsistent. Whether or not Burrows actually 
subscribes to this reasoning is debatable, for he also seems to be attracted to defining 
defences according to the distinction between denials and defences.12  
 
2.2.  Denials and Defences 
 
If a claimant sues in negligence, the defendant might deny that a duty of care was 
owed. To many writers, such a claim is not appropriately characterised as a defence; 
instead, it is a contention that, because one of its elements is absent, the cause of 
action is not made out. These writers therefore distinguish denials from defences. As 
Virgo puts it, ‘[a] denial negates an element of the tort claim, whereas a defence is a 
rule that relieves the defendant of liability where all the elements of the tort for which 
the claimant sues are present.’13 
 This distinction raises two important (and closely connected) disputes. The first is 
whether, as Luís Duarte d’Almeida puts it in his chapter, ‘the familiar contrast of 
denials/defences is substantively warranted.’14 Several contributors to this volume—
including Andrew Burrows,15 James Goudkamp and Lorenz Mayr,16 Robert Stevens17 
and Graham Virgo18—employ the distinction. But none offers a justification of it. Can 
a compelling justification be offered? The line between denials and defences can 
certainly appear razor thin. Most simply, both defences and denials can result in the 
same substantive outcome, that is, no liability.19 Further, individual doctrines seem to 
resist categorisation. This might be for a number of reasons. One reason might be that 
an individual doctrine can, on some definitions, be both a defence and a denial. 
Consider, in this respect, Roderick Bagshaw’s claim that defences are ‘those doctrines 
that allow a defendant to resist in whole, or in part, a tort claim, other than by denying 
an essential element of it.’20 This appears to endorse the denial/defence distinction. 
With reference to this definition, Bagshaw claims that the ‘intervening acts doctrine’ 
is a defence.21 But because this doctrine can prevent an action of which damage is the 
gist, such as negligence, from being constituted,22 it appears sometimes to be a denial. 
This is not a point Bagshaw denies; his purpose is not to classify the doctrine in terms 
of defences and denials. But it illustrates a possible hazard of the denial/defence 
distinction. Perhaps with such concerns in mind, James Edelman and Esther Dyer 
simply reject the distinction: ‘[a] defence has always included a plea by way of 
                                                 
12  At 000 
13  [Text at fn 24] (footnote omitted). 
14  [Text just before fn4.] Further disagreements might manifest here over what makes a distinction 
‘substantively warranted’. Having noted this further important complication, for brevity’s sake we 
set it to one side in our discussion. 
15  [Text at fns 11–12]. 
16  [Text near fn 59]. 
17  [Text at footnote 13]. 
18  [Text at fn 24] 
19  Duarte d’Almeida at A4, 13 (‘from the purely consequentialist perspective there is simply no 
difference between “denials” and “defences”’). 
20  Section 1.3 of his paper, p.6, c.fn19. Consider also Goudkamp and Mayr’s contention that the 
doctrine of illegality sometimes functions as a denial and sometimes as a defence: section 4 of their 
paper. 
21  Discussed by Bagshaw [Text near fn 20]. 
22  See, eg, Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61; (2000) 205 CLR 254. 
denial’.23 In other words, for these writers a defence can include a denial of a cause of 
action 24  Most fundamentally, Duarte d’Almeida raises what he calls the 
‘Incorporationist Challenge’. This argument claims that defences and denials are 
‘equivalent’ because ‘both amount to the negation that all the elements required for 
the claimant to succeed are present’. 25  To answer this challenge, theorists must 
explain in what the distinction consists.  
This raises the second important disagreement enlivened by the distinction 
between denials and defences: if there is a substantially warranted distinction between 
the two concepts, what, precisely, is it? Duarte d’Almeida suggests a possible answer 
in his chapter. He suggests that we should understand the distinction in terms of the 
‘contrasting probatory behaviour’ of various facts. He points out that:26 
Unless all the elements of a tort (including ‘negative’ elements like 
absence of consent) are established, the claimant will fail; but the 
claimant’s success does not similarly depend on the absence of each valid 
defence being established.  
Does this suggestion adequately capture the distinction that commentators seek to 
draw by employing the vocabulary of denials and defences? The account will prove 
controversial. But we hope that it will also prompt others to explain in depth how they 
understand the distinction.  
 
2.3  What do Defences do?  
 
Legal concepts might be defined wholly or partly in terms of their legal effects.27 For 
instance, a cause of action has been defined as ‘a factual situation the existence of 
which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person’.28 
Likewise, Peter Birks once argued that unjust enrichment and restitution ‘quadrate’, 
such that all restitutionary responses are instances of unjust enrichment.29 Can we, in 
a similar fashion, define defences in terms of their effects?  
 Some writers contend that the recognition of something as a defence does not 
determine the legal outcome of the doctrine. For instance, Edelman and Dyer argue 
that duress ought to be a tort defence but are silent on the question of whether 
                                                 
23  [Text near footnote 104]. Epstein may also be read as rejecting the distinction. His approach is to 
favour a minimal prima facie case, supplemented by subsequent pleadings in a theoretically infinite 
sequence: Epstein, section 2. This may well deny any rigid notion of cause of action and defence. 
See, further, our discussion at 3.2. 
24  See, for instance, Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd [1998] HCA 37; (1998) 193 CLR 519, 
527 [8] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J): ‘defences are either by way of denial or confession and 
avoidance’. 
25  [Text at fn6.] 
26  [Text after fn36.] For a fuller account, see L Duarte d’Almeida, ‘A Proof-Based Account of Legal 
Exceptions’ (2013) 33 OJLS 133 and L Duarte d’Almeida, Allowing for Exceptions: A Theory of 
Defences and Defeasibility in Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press) (forthcoming). 
27  By ‘effect’ we mean, speaking loosely, to denote the consequences that flow from the fact that a 
defence applies, as distinct from the implications for a given rule of it being classified as a defence. 
28  Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 (CA) 242–43 (Diplock LJ). 
29  For instance, P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, rev edn (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1989) 16–18. Compare his definition of ‘wrongs’, where any response was thought to be logically 
possible: P Birks, ‘Definition and Division: A Meditation on the Institutions 3.13’ in P Birks (ed), 
The Classification of Obligations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) 31. For a general discussion of 
these issues, see F Wilmot-Smith, ‘§38 and the Lost Doctrine of Failure of Consideration’ in C 
Mitchell and W Swadling (eds), The Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: 
Critical and Comparative Essays (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 64–69. 
compensation must be paid when it applies: they see this as a question that can be 
dealt with once the defence is recognised.30 This suggests that, for these writers, not 
every effect of a defence is crucial to its definition as such. They might claim that 
some effects are constitutive of the concept of a defence. Many would make such a 
claim. There is, however, disagreement about the precise relationship between 
definition and effect, a disagreement that we addressed above.31 Some scholars define 
defences in terms of their effects (the effect of some doctrine is, in other words, 
constitutive of that doctrine being a defence);32 others claim that particular doctrines 
have (or should have) various effects because they are defences.33 In this subsection 
we do not seek to take sides on these issues, but to enumerate some of the various 
effects that are claimed can constitute, or can be the consequence of, defences.   
 We should first consider the distinction between substance and procedure. This is 
often invoked, but in what does it consist? Speaking generally, we suggest that the 
answer might correspond to the distinction between obligations owed by agents and 
the ability to have those obligations enforced by a court. By ‘substantive’ doctrines, 
theorists seem to denote those doctrines that affect the responsibilities that individuals 
have. For instance, contributory negligence (which, for some, is a doctrine that counts 
as a defence) reduces the amount of damages the defendant owes the claimant, and is 
consequently counted as substantive. 34 Other doctrines—those doctrines that 
commentators call ‘procedural’—do not seem to function in this manner. For 
instance, Andrew Burrows notes that ‘with rare exceptions’ a limitation defence does 
not extinguish the obligation to pay damages;35 instead, it bars enforcement of that 
duty in court.36 A practical consequence of this distinction can be demonstrated in the 
law of unjust enrichment. Suppose that a defendant owes a claimant £100, but the 
claimant’s claim is time barred. If the defendant pays the claimant £100 in the 
mistaken belief that the claim is not time barred, she cannot recover the money paid.37 
The reason is that, although the expiration of the limitation period barred enforcement 
of the claim, the substance of the claim remained: there is, in the language of Goff and 
Jones a ‘justifying ground’ for the payment.38  
 Doubtless, the import of this distinction between substance and procedure remains 
a topic worthy of further consideration. For our purposes, however, the crucial 
question is whether the distinction furthers our understanding of what a defence is. 
                                                 
30  [Text near fn 116]. This raises two questions: first, what the defence does, if not relieve the 
defendant from an obligation to pay damages; and, more generally, how much commentators must 
explain when they argue that a defence should be recognised. 
31  See 2.1 on the distinction between definition and consequence. 
32  This may be the best way to understand Bagshaw’s claim that defences are those rules that ‘operate 
to prevent the claimant from being awarded a particular form of remedy which would have been 
available had the conditions for the applicability of the “defence” not been established.’ [Text near 
fn 18]. 
33  This is one way to read Stevens’ claim at [Text accompanying fn 16]. 
34  We do not think that it matters whether one believes the defendant to be under a duty to pay these 
damages, or merely a liability: see also n 35. 
35  There is some controversy over whether the defendant is under a duty to pay damages: eg, S Smith, 
‘Why Courts Make Orders (And What This Tells us About Damages)’ (2011) 64 Current Legal 
Problems 51. However, whatever term is used, we suggest that it is important to distinguish 
between the defendant’s responsibility to pay damages and his liability to a court order enforcing 
that responsibility. 
36  Burrows, footnote 12. 
37  Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005; 97 ER 676. 
38  C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson, Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment 8th edn 
(London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2011) …. 
Duarte d’Almeida claims that it is vital.39 He distinguishes elements which bear ‘on 
the merits’ of the case from ‘[b]ackground presuppositions and conditions … that are 
often called “procedural”’. 40  The procedural rules are not, he claims, the proper 
subject of a theory of defences: hence he excludes challenges to jurisdiction and 
limitation as defences. 41  Bagshaw disagrees. He includes within his definition of 
defences those rules that ‘will prevent a claimant from being awarded an injunction if 
he or she has waited too long before seeking such a remedy.’42 As these rules concern 
the enforcement of an obligation, Bagshaw implicitly rejects Duarte d’Almeida’s 
claim. 
This provides us with an illuminating lens through which to consider the famous 
case of Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation Co.43 A captain secured his ship to the 
claimant’s dock to prevent it from being destroyed by a storm. The storm repeatedly 
threw the ship against the dock, damaging the dock in the process. The defendant ship 
owner was found liable to the claimant in trespass even though (the court held) the 
captain had acted reasonably in securing the ship to the dock. The conventional way 
of explaining this case, which is embraced by Graham Virgo in his chapter,44 is to say 
that it recognises a privilege to act out of private necessity.45 This privilege is said to 
be evident from the fact that, were it possible to obtain injunctions instantly, and had 
the claimant sought one to restrain the captain from tethering the ship to his dock, a 
judge would have refused one.46 But the privilege is incomplete. It is incomplete 
because the defendant was still liable to pay damages to the dock owner. How we 
should understand the case remains a hotly disputed matter.47 That is not a question 
we consider; instead, our concern is with the possible implications for the concept of a 
defence. Let us suppose that the suggested privilege simply recognises that an 
injunction will not be granted to restrain a trespass committed in circumstances of 
private necessity. Assuming that it is right to understand these rules as procedural, 
that is, as concerning when a court will specifically enforce an obligation an 
individual has, whether so-called incomplete privileges are an appropriate topic for 
scholars of defences then turns on whether it is correct to define defences as 
substantive doctrines.  
Plainly, not every substantive doctrine is a defence. Assuming that defences are 
substantive doctrines, then, which substantive doctrines are they? Can we, in 
particular, use the different substantive effects that doctrines can have to delineate the 
concept of defences yet further? (Or are defences delineated by reference to some 
other criteria?) For instance, some doctrines defeat entirely a defendant’s 
responsibility, while others merely reduce the extent of the defendant’s obligations. 
By way of example, a successful plea of illegality might result in no liability;48 
                                                 
39  We believe that his distinctions at p 14 (A4) roughly, though perhaps not precisely, track ours. 
40  Duarte d’Almeida p 14 (A4). 
41  Duarte d’Almeida p 14 (A4) (jurisdiction) p 16 (A4) (limitation). 
42  [Text near fn 18].  
43  109 Minn 456; 124 NW 221 (1910). 
44  [Section 3.2 of his chapter]. 
45  See, eg, WP Keeton, DB Dobbs, RE Keeton and DG Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th edn 
(St Paul MN, West Publishing Co, 1984) 147–48. 
46  The privilege is also thought to be revealed from the fact that had the claimant cut the ship loose, 
the claimant would have been liable to the ship owner: Ploof v Putnam 81 Vt 471; 71 A 188 (1908). 
47  This reading of the case is controversial amongst our contributors. As well as Virgo, see Goldberg 
[Text near fn 31] and Smith (this volume) at p.11 (A4). 
48  Joyce v O’Brien [2013] EWCA Civ 546; [2014] 1 WLR 70. Illegality can in some cases merely 
reduce the extent of the primary obligation: Hewison v Meridian Shipping Services Pte Ltd [2002] 
whereas a successful plea of contributory negligence might merely reduce the 
damages owed from (say) £100 to £50. Does this distinction have any value when it 
comes to defining defences? Bagshaw49 and Stevens50 deny that it does: both claim 
that contributory negligence is a defence. However, other scholars, such as Francis 
Trindade, Peter Cane and Mark Lunney, have claimed that the fact that contributory 
negligence only reduces the extent of damages means that it is not a defence.51 
 To sum up, one popular way of understanding defences is to distinguish them from 
denials. Another way (and the way that we have addressed here) is to hive off 
procedural rules and to exclude them from the concept of a defence. Of course, 
neither way of trying to get to grips with the idea of a defence suggests a 
comprehensive definition of a defence. They are both just ways of saying what 
defences are not. It is clear, for instance, that even if procedural rules are not 
defences, not all substantive rules qualify as defences. These two ways of conceiving 
of defences do not exhaust the possible bases by which the concept of a defence might 
be isolated. We have focused on these ways of determining what a defence is because 
they have featured prominently in the chapters that constitute this volume. 
 
3. Themes Across Private Law 
 
3.1.   The Interplay of Causes of Action and Defences 
 
It is trite that the elements of a cause of action must have a bearing on the defences 
that are available to liability arising in that action. This point applies across private 
law’s causes of action. For example, if the absence of justification is part of the 
definition of a cause of action, it is impossible for there to be a justificatory defence to 
liability arising in that action.52 If the defendant was justified, the action will not be 
constituted; it follows that no question of defences can arise. But commentators have 
not explored this type of interrelation in any depth.  
In her contribution to this volume, McDonald makes some general claims on the 
topic. She suggests that the ‘fault element in the tort can influence the available 
defences’. 53  For instance, she claims that ‘negligence is essentially about a 
defendant’s failure to take reasonable precautions against a foreseeable risk of injury 
to the claimant’.54 It follows, she claims, that it is ‘morally justifiable’ for the law ‘to 
consider also the claimant’s behaviour in relation to that risk’.55 This leads McDonald 
to the conclusion that the doctrine of contributory negligence is justifiably applicable 
in the context of negligence-based torts.56 Other scholars, including Ernest Weinrib57 
                                                                                                                                           
EWCA Civ 1821; [2003] ICR 766 (the illegality prevented the recovery of lost illegal earnings, but 
not the recovery of damages for other losses suffered as a result of injury caused to the claimant). 
49  [Text near fn 20]. 
50  [Text at footnote 13]. See also Barbara McDonald’s chapter where she refers to contributory 
negligence as ‘a key defence to a negligence action’: at … [text near fn 63]. 
51  ‘[C]ontributory negligence is strictly a plea in mitigation of damages rather than a defence’: F 
Trindade, P Cane and M Lunney, The Law of Torts in Australia, 4th ed (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 685.  
52  This point is made, albeit in slightly different terms, by Steve Smith in his contribution to this 
volume: page 1 of A4.  
53  [Text near fn 61]. 
54  [Text near n 64] (emphasis in original). 
55  [Text near n 64].  
56  Cf Robert Stevens’ chapter in this volume. 
57  ‘The defense [of contributory negligence] expresses an idea of transaction equality: the plaintiff 
cannot demand that the defendant should observe a greater care than the plaintiff with respect to the 
and Kenneth Simons,58 have made broadly similar claims regarding the doctrine of 
contributory negligence. In contrast to the tort of negligence, McDonald says that:59 
 
intentional torts generally involve a prima facie wrong and a more culpable level of 
fault, and thus will be more difficult to defend, requiring a higher level of culpability or 
responsibility on the claimant’s part to excuse the defendant’s conduct. Thus while 
contributory negligence is powerful in a negligence claim, it is irrelevant to an 
intentional tort. 
 
McDonald applies these claims to the defence of public interest to a privacy tort.60 
She argues that breach of privacy is an intentional wrong and claims that we should 
therefore ‘immediately ignore defences to negligence actions. Contributory 
negligence, for example, should be no more a defence to an invasion of privacy than it 
is to any other intentional tort.’61 Depending on how McDonald defines the term 
‘defence’, we suspect that this claim is too strong, since it is doubtful that all defences 
to negligence should have no application to actions for breach of privacy. Does 
McDonald mean to say that limitation bars, for example, should have no application 
to actions for breach of privacy?62 Regardless, the general claim that the presence or 
lack of a fault element may influence, or should influence, the availability of defences 
is worthy of further investigation. 
 Richard Epstein, in his chapter on voluntary assumption of risk, also engages with 
the interaction between causes of action and defences. He argues: ‘As a matter of 
basic normative theory, the proper role of defences is heavily dependent on the 
content of the prima facie case, which in turn depends heavily on whether the starting 
point for liability is strict liability, negligence, or intention’.63 If one incorporates a 
fault rule into what he calls the ‘prima facie case’, many pleas that could otherwise be 
introduced as defences are dealt with by the fault rule and cannot therefore operate as 
defences. Conversely, if the cause of action is based on strict liability, a much larger 
number of pleas are available to function as defences. Epstein believes this to be an 
advantage of strict liability. His reason for so thinking is that putting the minimum 
amount of information in the ‘prima facie case’ necessary to put the defendant under 
an onus of explanation sharpens the enquiry. This is primarily because it allows the 
pleas to be introduced in a clear and logical sequence.  
 
3.2.   The Generality and Specificity of Defences 
 
Although some scholars have argued to the contrary,64 the prevailing view today is 
that we have a law of torts rather than a law of tort, in the sense that there is no single 
                                                                                                                                           
plaintiff’s safety. … Because contributory negligence looks at the fault of the plaintiff relative to 
the fault of the defendant in their interaction, it is entirely a transaction notion’: EJ Weinrib, The 
Idea of Private Law (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1995) 169 n 53.  
58  ‘[W]hat victims can legitimately expect of injurers, injurers can legitimately expect of victims’: 
K Simons, ‘The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence’ (1995) 16 Cardozo Law Review 
1693, 1722 (footnote omitted). 
59  … (footnote omitted) [Text near n 66]. 
60  McDonald has in mind the action in cases such as Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 
AC 457. 
61  [Text near fn 91]. 
62  McDonald might, instead, deny that limitation is a defence: for a possible route to this conclusion, 
see 2.3 and Duarte d’Almeida p 16 (A4) (limitation). 
63  [Text at p.4] 
64  Eg, PH Winfield, The Province of Tort Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1931) ch 3. 
principle of liability that unites this entire branch of private law.65 We have many 
different actions in tort, rather than a single action in tort, and similar observations 
can be made about other areas of private law, such as unjust enrichment, where it is 
conventional to speak of an action in unjust enrichment rather than the action in 
unjust enrichment. It is interesting to observe a parallel here between causes of action 
and defences. It would be perfectly possible to have, for example, a single 
justificatory defence operating across all of tort law. However, what we find (at least 
according to the way in which defences tend to be presented in tort textbooks) is a 
large number of justificatory defences that each operate within their own spheres of 
influence.66 These justificatory defences include rules such as necessity, self-defence, 
defence of property, publication of a defamatory statement in the public interest, and 
so on.  
Why have tort defences (and, perhaps, defences in some other branches of private 
law) developed in this way? Furthermore, is this state of affairs satisfactory? Several 
of the chapters in the present volume offer thoughts in this connection. Barbara 
McDonald, for example, queries how defences should be developed in relation to an 
action for breach of privacy. The law could opt for a very broad defence of public 
interest, or it could fashion several more precise defences that are sensitive to public 
interest considerations. McDonald (without expressing a firm conclusion) seems to be 
sympathetic to the latter approach, on the basis that defendants will be able to predict 
more easily whether they will benefit from a defence than would be possible if there 
were a single broad, generalised defence. A broad defence, she claims, will ‘leav[e] it 
to the judgment of an individual judge as to whether the balance justifies the 
defendant’s behaviour in the particular case.’67  
Paul Davies, in his chapter on defences and third parties, also touches upon this 
theme. His major concern is with the defence of justification in the context of 
secondary participation in a breach of contract. Davies asks whether the defence 
should be cast broadly or instead confined to specific situations, which is very closely 
related to the point addressed by McDonald.68 Davies enunciates some arguments for 
and against making the defence available to the entire ocean of factual situations in 
which accessories might incur liability in tort, versus what might be called an ‘island’ 
approach. He sees a broad approach as having the advantage of flexibility but at the 
cost of reduced certainty, and notes that the criminal law in the context of the 
statutory offence of assisting or encouraging crime69 has taken this route.70  
 
3.3.   Theories of Tort Law and Defences 
                                                 
65  Eg, WVH Rogers writes: ‘There is … no doubt that we have a collection of torts rather than a 
single principle of liability’: WVH Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 18th edn (London, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2010) 63. The contribution that has come to epitomise the ‘law of torts’ view is 
B Rudden, ‘Torticles’ (1991–1992) 6/7 Tulane Civil Law Forum 105, which seeks to list all torts.  
66  Of course, some of these defences have a larger sphere of influence than others and there is an 
extensive amount of overlap. For example, the defence of necessity (which is addressed by Graham 
Virgo in his chapter in this volume) is not limited by much of the fencing that confines the defence 
of self-defence, although both defences cover some of the same terrain. If the two defences might 
be envisaged in terms of intersecting circles, we suggest that the circle representing necessity would 
be considerably larger.  
67  [Text near fn 125]. 
68  [Text between fns 27 and 52]. 
69  Serious Crime Act 2007 (UK) ss 44–49. 
70  ibid s 50.  
 Several scholars have offered general theoretical accounts of the law of torts. These 
include economic accounts 71  and explanations of torts as a law of interpersonal 
wrongs.72 Some of these theorists contend that their account can explain not just tort 
law but private law generally. 73  The chapters by Chief Justice McLachlin, John 
Goldberg and Robert Stevens raise an issue as to the significance of defences for such 
theories. Two questions are presented. The first is how we should understand 
particular defences within general theories of tort law. Should a given theory of tort 
law seek to account for the range of defences that are found in tort law? The second is 
what should be done if we find that a particular defence does not seem to cohere with 
the theory in particular. What are the implications of a lack of concordance between a 
defence and a theory? 
 
3.3.1. Corrective Justice 
 
Several theorists, such as Ernest Weinrib74 and Allan Beever,75 have claimed that tort 
law is explained by a theory of corrective justice. Very simply, these theorists argue 
that torts are injustices committed by a single defendant against a single claimant, and 
that tort remedies aim to reverse that injustice. The Chief Justice, in her contribution 
to this volume, claims that these theories provide a ‘principled basis for the law of 
tort.’76 However, her inquiry is not into the theory as a whole; instead, she aims to 
explain how the law on illegality can be squared with the corrective justice theory.77  
Two key claims are made in the Chief Justice’s chapter. The first is that invoking 
the doctrine of illegality to deny claims simply because the claimant happened to be 
injured while acting illegally, even if the criminal act is causally implicated in the 
claimant’s damage, is inconsistent with corrective justice. This is because it ‘asks the 
court to consider the claimant independently of the defendant. In doing so it disrupts 
the correlative and integrated structure of a corrective justice model’.78 The fact that 
the claimant acted illegally has nothing, the Chief Justice writes, to do with the 
relationship between the parties. The second claim is that in very limited 
circumstances denying recovery on the ground of illegality is consistent with 
corrective justice.  The main situation that the Chief Justice has in mind is where the 
claimant seeks damages in respect of the imposition of a criminal law sanction. The 
Chief Justice considers that rejecting such claims via the illegality defence is 
consistent with corrective justice on the basis that the claimant has suffered no loss, 
and without a loss, there is not correctible injustice.79  
                                                 
71  Richard Posner was responsible more than anyone else for what might be called the first-wave of 
the law-and-economics movement, mainly as a result of his RA Posner, ‘A Theory of Negligence’ 
(1972) 1 Journal of Legal Studies 29 and WM Landes and RA Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Tort Law (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1987).  
72  We have in mind here writings such as Weinrib (n 57), Stevens (n 3) and JCP Goldberg and BC 
Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’ (2010) 88 Texas Law Review 917. 
73  See, eg, Weinrib (n 57). 
74  Weinrib (n 57) [IBID?].  
75  A Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007).  
76  [Text near fn 7]. 
77  [Text near fn 11]. 
78  [Text at fn 79]. 
79  [Text from fn 83 to fn 85]. 
The Chief Justice considers that the law on illegality in Canada complies with 
corrective justice,80 while the very different rules that govern the defence elsewhere in 
the common law world do not.81 She does not state whether she believes that the law 
elsewhere, which she asserts does not comply, at least not fully, with corrective 
justice, ought to be changed on account of the lack of compliance with corrective 
justice. However, significantly, she criticises the law on illegality in tort in other 
jurisdictions on the basis that it is unsupported by policy considerations, such as 
whether the doctrine deters offending.82 Given that the centrality of corrective justice 
theory to her chapter, this suggests that she regards policy considerations as relevant 
to corrective justice accounts of tort law, contrary to the views of several prominent 
corrective justice theorists.83  
 
3.3.2. Rights Theory 
 
In Torts and Rights, Stevens contended that a rights-based theory provided the best 
explanation of the whole of the law of torts.84 Expressed very simply, the central idea 
is that torts are violations of primary rights and that, inter alia, tort law provides 
victims of such violations with a remedy that is substitutive of that primary right. 
Stevens’ analysis in Torts and Rights only addressed the doctrine of contributory 
negligence in passing.85 It did not consider the relationship between the doctrine and 
his theory of tort; instead, Stevens confined himself to criticising the drafting of the 
British apportionment legislation, namely, the Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act 1945 (UK).86  
In his contribution to this volume, Stevens specifically addresses the law on 
contributory negligence. He argues that the entire law on contributory negligence (and 
not just the scheme of apportionment adopted by the 1945 Act) should be abolished, 
with the result being that fault on the part of the claimant would ordinarily have no 
bearing on either liability or the quantification of damages. Contributory negligence 
should, in his view, cease to be a free-standing rule, and fault on the part of the 
claimant should be relevant only insofar as other rules, such as the principle of 
intervening causation, are sensitive to it.  
Stevens’ arguments against contributory negligence indicate that he regards the 
defence as incompatible with his rights theory. He begins by suggesting that the issue 
of ‘whether contributory fault should be a defence [should be] determined by why it is 
thought that damages are payable for the commission of torts’.87 Stevens then claims: 
(1) that tort law is about rights; and (2) that the doctrine of contributory negligence is 
not explicable in terms of rights because the claimant’s rights are unaffected by 
                                                 
80  See, especially, Hall v Hebert [1993] 2 SCR 159 (SCC).  
81  See, eg, Miller v Miller [2011] HCA 9; (2011) 242 CLR 446 and Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] 
UKHL 33; [2009] 1 AC 1339.  
82  [Text from fn 30 to fn 38]. 
83  See, eg, Beever (n 75) 52–54; Weinrib (n 57) 220–21. 
84  Stevens (n 3).  
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86  Stevens (n 3) 124–26.  
87  … 
carelessness on his part that risks only his own interests.88 As a further step, Stevens 
also implies (3) that the law should be changed to bring it into conformity with the 
rights-based understanding of tort law, by abolishing apportionment for contributory 
negligence.89 
 
3.3.3. Civil Recourse Theory 
 
John Goldberg has promoted a theoretical account of tort law that is based on civil 
recourse for wrongs. 90  This theory shares much in common with both corrective 
justice theory (it has been argued that the theories are effectively the same91) and with 
rights theory. The gist of civil recourse theory is that tort law is not a system for 
providing compensation for losses caused by accidents, or for deterring inefficient 
behaviour (although it has those effects), but is a mechanism by which victims of 
interpersonal wrongs can hold the wrongdoer to account. Goldberg’s chapter in this 
volume addresses the role of excuses in tort law through the lens of civil recourse 
theory.92 We discuss excuses directly later,93 and engage more fully with Goldberg’s 
chapter there. For present purposes, we confine our remarks to the implications of 
Goldberg’s analysis for civil recourse theory.  
Goldberg considers that tort law is largely insensitive to excuses although he 
believes that excuses occasionally intrude into tort law. What are the implications of 
this claim (if it is correct) for his theory? One might think that the lack of excuses is a 
challenge to the theory: if excused defendants are not released from liability does that 
mean that tort is affixing liability to conduct that is not really wrong?94 Goldberg’s 
response is that it is possible to say coherently that an excused defendant commits a 
wrong. This leads him to the conclusion that tort law ‘can cogently refuse to recognise 
excuses’. 95  Goldberg appears to believe, therefore, that both the general lack of 
excuses in tort law, and the fact that excuses sometimes crop up in tort law, is 
consistent with civil recourse theory. In other words, he thinks, as we read him, that it 
does not matter for the purposes of civil recourse theory whether or not tort law 
contains excuses.  
 
                                                 
88  ‘[T]he risks I run in relation to my own interests are nobody’s concern but mine.’ (at …). 
89  It is worth noting that, although a radical reform, Stevens is not alone in making this 
recommendation. Patrick Atiyah famously suggested that the doctrine should be abandoned, at least 
in the context of personal injuries: P Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 7th ed, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006) 60–61 [update to latest ed]. Given that Atiyah had 
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91  EJ Weinrib, ‘Civil Recourse and Corrective Justice’ (2011) 39 Florida State University Law Review 
273, 297 arguing that ‘differences between civil recourse and corrective justice, if they exist at all, 
are gossamer thin’. Cf BC Zipursky, ‘Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice’ (2003) 91 
Georgetown Law Journal 695. 
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JCP Goldberg, ‘Inexcusable Wrongs’ (2015) 103 California Law Review (forthcoming).  
93  See 4.2.3. 
94  This does seem to be a concern of Goldberg: see the discussion at p.3 (A4).  
95  (at …). We suggest, below, that Goldberg might in parts of his chapter go rather further than this 
and claim that tort law is properly insensitive to excuses: see 4.2.3. 
3.4.   Statute Law and Defences 
 
Several chapters in this volume engage with defences that are at least partially statute- 
based. For instance, Andrew Burrows tackles issues in the law of limitation of 
actions, much of which is legislative in origin. There are several important points to 
make in this respect. First, the present law on limitation is a warning to those 
considering piecemeal statutory reform. As Burrows highlights, many seemingly 
arbitrary differences exist as one moves from one cause of action to another in 
relation to both the duration of the limitation period96 and the point at which time 
begins to run.97 Secondly, limitation is also an excellent illustration of the fact that, 
generally speaking, legislation has infiltrated the law on tort defences to a much 
greater extent than in relation to that part of the law of torts that specifies the elements 
of causes of action. The fact that the legislature’s attention has been skewed in this 
way is a notable feature of tort law. One possible explanation for this focus is that 
when the legislature wants to provide a particular group of stakeholders with 
protection from liability in tort, it finds it easier to do this by way of tweaking the law 
on defences rather than the elements of torts. It is relatively simple to single out 
specific groups of persons for heightened protection by changing the law on defences, 
whereas if the elements of torts are altered there is (or might be thought to be) an 
increased risk that the change will be broader than necessary.98  
 In his contribution, Donal Nolan is also concerned with statutory tort defences. 
Nolan’s principal interest is the law regarding the effect of planning permission and 
its relationship with the defence of statutory authority. Judges regularly observe, as 
Nolan notes, that the fact a defendant has been granted planning permission to carry 
out a given activity is not the same as statutory authorisation of that activity. 
However, Nolan argues that ‘in amenity nuisance cases where the implementation of 
planning permission is deemed to have changed the nature of the locality, the 
planning consent has the same effect as the statutory authorisation of the defendant’s 
activity’.99 Nolan claims that this rule concerning planning permission is, therefore, a 
de facto extension of the statutory authority defence. Nolan criticises this situation on 
the ground that allowing planning permission to mimic the defence of statutory 
authority is unsupported by the rationale for recognising the defence of statutory 
authority, namely, that it gives expression to the will of Parliament. As Nolan puts it: 
‘the justification for allowing direct expression of legislative will to abrogate private 
rights [via the defence of statutory authority] does not extend to administrative 
decisions of the kind involved in the planning process.’100 This argument illustrates 
another cautionary tale of statutes and the common law: the need to examine carefully 
a particular statutory defence (including its rationale) before relying on it for a 
common law analogy. Although Nolan is concerned only with the law of nuisance, his 
analysis is of wider significance. One area of the law on which it might throw light is 
the defence of illegality, where judges have, at least in some jurisdictions, often 
                                                 
96  [X-ref to Burrows]. 
97  [X-ref to Burrows]. 
98  This suggestion is discussed further in J Goudkamp ‘Statutes and Tort Defences’ in J Steele and TT 
Arvind (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics of Legal 
Change (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013).  
99  [Text near fn 55]. Locality is irrelevant in physical nuisance cases pursuant to St Helen’s Smelting 
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100  [Text near fn 67]. 
developed the common law on this point by reference to the criminal law legislation 
that the claimant contravened.101  
 
4.  Themes from the Criminal Law 
 
4.1.  Is Criminal Law Scholarship and Doctrine Relevant? 
 
In contrast with the scant learning that exists regarding tort defences, the scholarship 
on defences to criminal law is voluminous and highly sophisticated.102 It is tempting, 
therefore, for tort scholars to look to this work for inspiration and arguments, 
especially given the apparent parallels that exist between many tort law defences and 
criminal law defences. One might also be inclined to argue that tort law should adopt 
certain criminal law principles. Virgo does both of these things in his chapter, as do 
Edelman and Dyer. For instance, in thinking about the defence of necessity, Virgo 
makes ‘extensive reference … to criminal law theory and doctrine’.103 He does this 
‘in part because much more work has been done by criminal law theorists in 
analysing the nature of defences generally and necessity in particular’.104 Edelman 
and Dyer claim that the definitional elements of the tort of intimidation were 
developed by reference to criminal liability for unlawful pressure (menaces). They 
then suggest that ‘[t]he same process of parallel development, applied to defences, 
would see the well-recognised defence of duress in criminal law extended to torts’.105 
But whether it is legitimate to draw upon criminal law scholarship and principles is 
contentious. As Chief Justice McLachlin observes in her chapter:106 
 
The traditional approach is to think of tort law and criminal law as non-
overlapping magisteria, or separate bodies of law. While the norms of tort law 
and criminal law can sometimes be applied to the same event, neither body of 
law is relevant to the other because their objectives are different. 
 
A question that arises, therefore, is the extent to which these scholars can make use of 
criminal law theory and doctrine. Is it permissible to incorporate directly large 
amounts of criminal theory and doctrine? Should they, instead, proceed only more 
cautiously and selectively? Or should torts scholars refrain completely from looking 
to the criminal law for guidance? At this last extreme, Jules Coleman claims that 
‘[t]he differences between torts and the criminal law are so fundamental that the net 
result of applying one’s understanding of the criminal law to torts is bad philosophy 
and total confusion’.107  
                                                 
101  See, eg, Revill v Newbery [1996] QB 567 (CA); Miller v Miller [2011] HCA 9; (2011) 242 CLR 
446. 
102  For a taste of the criminal law writing, see HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968); G Williams, ‘Offences and Defences’ (1982) 
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A slightly different question from that of whether criminal law theory and doctrine 
should ever be applied in the tort law context is whether tort law’s rules ought to be 
fashioned in the light of the criminal law’s principles. Chief Justice McLachlin 
contends that it is imperative that tort law (and, as we read her, private law generally) 
ought to be so developed, on the ground that the law as a whole must be coherent for 
rule-of-law reasons.108  
Regardless of where one stands on the broader methodological issues, scholarship 
in tort law is increasingly dealing with several themes most commonly associated 
with criminal law defences. In the remainder of this section we examine two of these 
themes which were pertinent at the workshop and in the papers in this book.  
 
4.2.  Justifications and Excuses 
 
4.2.1.  Is the Division Useful? 
 
Criminal lawyers conventionally distinguish between justificatory and excusatory 
defences, and a vast literature exists in this regard.109 Should tort lawyers think in 
these terms? This question proved to be highly controversial at the workshop. Some 
participants were concerned only with the substantive outcomes of a successful plea 
and, considering that both justificatory and excusatory defences (assuming that the 
latter already exist in tort law or are introduced into tort law110) yield a verdict for the 
defendant, doubted whether we should care about such a classification. In their 
chapter on duress, James Edelman and Esther Dyer reject the usefulness of employing 
the labels ‘justification’ and ‘excuse’ in tort law for different reasons. Their main 
claim in this regard is that these terms are unhelpful because there is no consensus as 
to their meaning.111 In particular, they point out that criminal lawyers are deeply 
divided as to whether the defence of duress is a justification or an excuse (or both, as 
some have argued 112 ). This leads them to argue that, if a defence of duress is 
introduced into tort law, it should be known as a ‘privilege’.113  
Nevertheless, several contributors to this volume insist on retaining the distinction 
between justifications and excuses both for theoretical and practical reasons. John 
Goldberg, for example, sees at least theoretical value in separating justifications from 
excuses. As we will discuss below, he believes that tort law properly admits 
justifications to its repertoire of defences but for the most part refuses to recognise 
excuses.114 In his chapter, Paul Davies points to one way in which the distinction 
might be significant in practical terms. He contends that if a principal wrongdoer has 
a defence, the issue of whether it is a justification or an excuse may affect whether an 
accessory is entitled to the same defence.115 Consider the following two situations 
(our examples, not Davies’). In the first situation, D1 uses reasonable force against C, 
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109  Douglas Husak observes that ‘[p]erhaps the most significant and controversial research program 
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Law Review 1897, 1912. 
113  [Text near fn 116]. 
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who was about to attack her. D2 assists D1. If D1 is justified (as she plainly is), D2 
might be able to invoke that justification. In the second situation, D1 strikes C 
because C provoked her. D2 (who was not provoked) assists D1. Many theorists 
believe that in this situation D1 merely has an excuse,116 and it might be asserted that 
any defence that the law gives to D1 should not, because D1 is excused, be enjoyed 
by D2.117  
We note that, if the distinction between justifications and excuses is brought to 
bear on tort law defences, it would plainly not capture all tort defences. For example, 
limitation bars (which are addressed by Andrew Burrows in his chapter) are neither in 
the nature of a justification nor an excuse.118 The same is true of the doctrine of 
illegality, which is treated by Chief Justice McLachlin, and by Goudkamp and Mayr 
in their chapters. The non-exhaustive nature of the distinction between justifications 
and excuses is specifically adverted to by Edelman and Dyer in their chapter, and they 
seem to see that as a reason for tort lawyers to avoid using the distinction.119 We have 
reservations about whether that is a good reason to shun the distinction as an 
organising device. Justifications and excuses do not exhaust all criminal law defences, 
and few criminal lawyers contend that the distinction should be abandoned for that 
reason.120 
 
4.2.2.  How We Should Understand Justified Acts? 
 
One of the most disputed questions in the philosophy of the criminal law, at least in 
recent years, is whether justified conduct is wrongful. The conventional view is that 
justified conduct is not wrong. Endorsing that view, George Fletcher writes: ‘[c]laims 
of justification ... challenge whether the act is wrongful’.121 The rival view, which has 
lately been gathering support, is that acts that enliven a justification defence remain 
wrong. John Gardner, for instance, doubts the conventional view.122 Surely, one might 
think, if anything calls for a justification, it is a wrong; yet on the conventional view, 
wrongs cannot be justified (because justified acts on that view are not wrong).123  
Three contributors to the present volume appear to endorse the conventional view. 
John Goldberg writes: ‘A justification maintains that, even though the defendant’s 
conduct meets the definition of the relevant wrong, it is not wrong when all relevant 
facts have been considered’.124 Robert Stevens claims that a justification will entail 
that ‘all things considered, nothing wrongful has been done’. 125  Graham Virgo 
perhaps embraces the conventional view more strongly than either Goldberg or 
Stevens, claiming that justified defendants do not even act in a ‘morally conflicted 
fashion’. 126  Paul Davies, by contrast, adheres to the rival view. He asserts that 
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‘[a]lthough it has been argued that “justifications deny wrongdoing”, the better view 
seems to be that even where the “primary wrongdoer” is justified, a wrong may might 
nevertheless have been committed’.127  
 There are several comments that we want to add to the foregoing. First, none of 
our contributors mounts a full-fledged argument in support of either view. They 
merely state their position en route to making other arguments. However, that distinct 
views on the question have arisen shows that the question may deserve closer 
attention in future work.128 Secondly, the extent of the practical significance of the 
distinction between the conventional view and the rival view remains to be seen. 
Davies suggests one way in which the issue might have real-world consequences. He 
suggests the rival view means that liability can properly attach to an accessory to a 
wrong even if the primary wrongdoer is justified.129 Conversely, he implies, if the 
conventional view were right, it would not be correct for the law to hold an accessory 
liable if the principal is justified. Thirdly, we believe that the word ‘wrong’ may be 
being used in different ways by different theorists, with the result that supposed 
differences between theorists may sometimes be illusory.130 An act might be ‘wrong’ 
in the sense of being in infringement of a right. This is how Robert Stevens uses the 
word in his chapter when he writes: ‘If you violate [my] right by punching me, you 
wrong me’.131 But an act might not violate any rights, but still be wrong in that there 
were undefeated, sufficient reasons not to perform it.132  
A related question to that of whether justified acts are wrong is whether justified 
acts should be encouraged. Some criminal law theorists, most notably Paul Robinson, 
have contended that they should be.133  Graham Virgo, in his contribution to the 
present volume, subscribes to this view. He writes that where a justification defence 
applies ‘it follows that the defendant’s conduct, which would otherwise be unlawful, 
is lawful and should be encouraged’.134 The claim that justified conduct ought to be 
encouraged is controversial. Many criminal law scholars view it with caution.135 
Whether or not this caution is warranted, it seems likely, given the interest that this 
issue has attracted among criminal law scholars, that it is also an important question 
for future tort law scholarship.  
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4.2.3.  Do Excuses to Torts Exist? Should They? 
 
It is widely accepted that the criminal law recognises excuses.136 What do tort lawyers 
think about their subject in this regard? Tort lawyers sometimes say things like ‘A 
will be liable to B if she does X without “justification or excuse”’.137 This suggests 
that some lawyers believe that tort law is sensitive to excuses, although such remarks 
are often made other than in the course of addressing squarely the issue of whether 
excuses exist in tort law, and so it is difficult to know how much one can read into 
them. Many—perhaps most—theorists who have considered the question directly 
claim that tort law does not recognise excuses.138 So the prevailing wisdom might 
fairly be said to be that excuses are alien to tort law. Is that wisdom correct? And, 
regardless of the answer to that question, should excuses play a role in tort law?139 
Several of the contributors to this volume address these questions in varying degrees 
of detail. The most extensive engagement is offered by John Goldberg.140 We have 
already discussed Goldberg’s chapter,141 focusing on the relevance of excuses to his 
civil recourse theory of tort law. We return to his chapter here to look directly at what 
he says about excuses. As we noted earlier, Goldberg claims that tort law is largely 
insensitive to excuses and that this insensitivity extends not only to the determination 
of liability, but also to the assessment of damages. However, he accepts that excuses 
creep in at tort law’s margins. For example, he observes that defendants who exercise 
self-defence on the basis of a reasonable mistake of fact are released from liability,142 
and suggests that these defendants are excused. This claim about how to categorise 
mistaken self-defence is extremely contentious. Many criminal lawyers will agree;143 
but many will not.144  
 What does Goldberg say in relation to the issue of whether tort law should 
recognise excuses? We noted earlier that Goldberg claims that it is merely justifiable 
for tort law to deny excuses.145 However, we wonder whether he is in fact committed 
to the proposition that excuses should have no role in tort law. In arguing that tort law 
can sensibly exclude excuses, Goldberg contrasts tort law (understood in terms of his 
civil recourse theory) with the criminal law. The criminal law, Goldberg reminds us, 
provides various protections to defendants, who are ‘pitched against the well-
resourced state’. These protections include the presumption of innocence, the 
principle that ambiguous penal statutes should be construed in the defendant’s favour, 
a steeply asymmetrical onus of proof in favour of the defendant, and restrictions on 
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the prosecution leading certain types of evidence, such as evidence of the defendant’s 
bad character. Goldberg claims that these protections include excuses.146 Conversely, 
he asserts, in tort law, the parties are equals and the law therefore deals with their 
interests in a ‘more evenhanded way.’ Goldberg says: ‘because tort law is in the 
business of empowering those who are wronged [in the inter-personal] sense, the 
demands placed on claimants are, on the whole, less onerous than those placed on 
prosecutors’.147 A key question here is whether withholding excuses actually deals 
with the parties ‘even-handedly’. Why should Goldberg’s claim about the general 
lack of excuses in tort law lead us to think that tort law so deals with the parties? 
Perhaps the denial of excuses actually gives an undue advantage to claimants. 
However, if Goldberg is correct, does it follow that the denial of excuses is merely 
justifiable? Given Goldberg’s belief that tort law deals with the parties even-
handedly, if withholding excuses is necessary in order to treat the parties equally 
surely the absence of excuses in tort law is justified? 
 Graham Virgo considers that tort law recognises an excuse in the form of private 
necessity. Since (at least in some jurisdictions148) the defendant remains liable to pay 
damages in private necessity cases, he reasons that the defendant cannot be justified. 
This suggests, Virgo says, that the defendant must instead be excused.149 It is unclear 
to us precisely what Virgo thinks defendants in private necessity cases are excused 
from if they remain liable to pay damages. 
 Edelman and Dyer’s chapter is also relevant to the issue of whether excuses should 
exist in tort law. They contend that a defence of duress should be ushered into tort 
law. We have already noted that Edelman and Dyer prefer to avoid using the label 
‘excuse’, at least in relation to duress.150 However, duress is often thought to be in the 
nature of an excuse. If, contrary to what Edelman and Dyer contend, the label 
‘excuse’ is rightly applied to duress, it is interesting to consider what implications 
their analysis may entail. One question is whether their analysis also supports 
welcoming certain other defences that are generally thought to be excuses into tort 
law, such as provocation (or loss of control, as it is now called in English criminal 
law).151 Some might argue that consistency demands this: if duress, which is often 
considered to be one of the criminal law’s core excuses, is ushered into tort law, it 
might be thought strange to exclude other excusatory defences found in the criminal 
law. Edelman and Dyer are silent on this issue.  
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5.  The Structure of the Book 
 
We have divided this book into two parts. Part A is concerned, roughly speaking, with 
issues of general interest to tort law defences as a whole. Part B is concerned with 
specific tort law defences. The distinction we have sought to draw is a rough one. 
Some of the chapters on general issues engage with some specific defences in detail; 
some of the chapters on specific defences raise questions of general interest. Indeed, 
some specific defences are of general application (for instance, limitation bars and 
illegality are defences to all torts) and some are not (contributory negligence, for 
example, probably applies only to the tort of negligence.) 
